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Weeding Out Wolves: Protecting
Speakers and Punishing Pirates in
Unmasking Analyses
ABSTRACT

How should courts determine whether to expose an anonymous
internet speaker's identity? Millions of Americans anonymously use the
internet. The overwhelming majority of anonymous users obscure their
identity while engaging in political or otherwise protected speech. A
substantial minority, however, obfuscate their true identity while
defaming others, piratingintellectual property, and otherwise breaking
the law to escape liabilityfor their wrongful actions, crying "free speech"
when sued. Courts tread a razor-thin line between protecting legitimate
exercises of free speech and exposing wrongdoers, as wrongful disclosure
chills speech and exposes innocent persons to the very real threat of
doxing. Conversely, failure to grant discovery into IP theft in a timely
manner imposes significant penalties on the injured party and the
economy at large given the huge sums of money bled out over time and
practical difficulties associated with actually unmasking bad actors.
Currently, courts trend between two tests that overprotect bad acts while
underprotecting legitimate speech. Courts should instead adopt a
defendant-friendly standardwith a presumption in favor of unmasking
defendants in IP piracy cases so as to protect legitimate speech while
providing a shortcut to unmask wolves in free-speech clothing.
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"While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying
the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views,
today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace-the 'vast democratic forums
of the Internet' in general and social media in particular."' Justice
Kennedy's assertion in Packingham v. North Carolina is well
supported. According to the latest Pew studies, over 89 percent of US
adults used the internet in 2018, a rate that cut across virtually every
demographic. 2 Social media holds a central position in modern
discourse, as millions of Americans utilize Facebook, Instagram,
Twitter, and other platforms each day. 3 Through status updates,
tweets, and direct messages, approximately seven out of ten Americans
shared and exposed themselves to many different ideas over social
media in 2018.4 Indeed, over 60 percent of Facebook, Snapchat, and
Instagram account holders use these sites daily.5 Additionally, over 80
percent of Americans own a smartphone-devices capable of (and
principally designed for) accessing the internet and social media on the
go. 6 The development of smartphones not only increased internet and

1.
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
2.
Internet/BroadbandFact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (June 12, 2019),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/ [https://perma.cc/HTN3-TGR2].
3.
Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (June 12, 2019),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ [https://perma.cc/99KM-UP2E].
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (June 12, 2019),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/QP62-WCL].

20191

PROTECTING SPEAKERS & PUNISHING PIRATES

183

social media use; it allowed individuals to communicate in real time
simply by removing a cellphone from their back pocket.
As the prominence of internet speech increases, so too does the
ease of speaking anonymously. Most social media websites do not
require profiles to be linked to a person's real-world identity.7 This
anonymity presents a free-speech problem for courts in a variety of legal
disputes involving the internet. Hypotheticals A, B, and C below
demonstrate some ways this problem manifests itself.
In hypothetical A, Adrienne works as Andrew's secretary.
Andrew is a bad boss, micromanaging Adrienne and her peers while at
the same time disappearing whenever he is actually needed. Adrienne
wants to warn others not to come work for her office without getting
reprimanded, fired, or otherwise punished for speaking poorly (though
truthfully) of her employer. Her solution: create an anonymous account
on Glassdoor and leave a scathing-but true-review of Andrew.
Andrew finds this review, becomes infuriated, and wants to sue
whoever left it for defamation to silence their (legitimate) criticism. 8
In hypothetical B, Betsy works as Bryan's secretary. Betsy
treats customers with disdain, poorly maintains Bryan's schedule, and
consistently shows up to work late. Bryan, upset with Betsy's
performance and attitude, decides to fire her. Angered, Betsy wants
revenge. However, she does not want Bryan to trace her actions back to
her. Her solution: create an anonymous account on Glassdoor and leave
a scathing (and untrue) review of Bryan. Bryan is aghast when he finds
this review. Despite being untrue, the review may damage his
reputation and business. Bryan wants to sue the anonymous speaker
who left the review for defamation.9
In hypothetical C, Chris, the owner of a local caf6, designed and
registered a prototype coffee bean grinder that could be made using a
3D printer. One day, while browsing a 3D printer file marketplace,10
Chris saw that an anonymous user posted a coffee bean grinder file with
his exact design. Infuriated, Chris wants to sue the user that stole and
posted his design.

See discussion infra Section I.E.
7.
8.
See infra Section II.D.2 for a case that mirrors these facts, Glassdoor, Inc. v. Andra
Grp., LP, 560 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. App. 2017), vacated, 575 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. 2019) (finding that the
underlying cause of action was moot).
9.
See infra Section II.D.1 for a case that mirrors these facts, In re Elliott, 504 S.W.3d
455 (Tex. App. 2016).
10.
For example, 3dprintboard.com is a forum where users can discuss and trade files for
3D printing. 3DPRINTBOARD.COM, https://3dprintboard.com/ [https://perma.cc/4H76-N9MJ] (last
visited Sept. 12, 2019).
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All three plaintiffs file hypothetical complaints in the same
district court, seeking to uncover who left the damaging reviews or
infringed on their design. How should courts balance the need to
vindicate an injured plaintiffs rights with that of protecting an
anonymous internet speaker's First Amendment rights?" Should it
differentiate between claims of defamation and infringement?
Moreover, even if it allows discovery, how is an anonymous internet
speaker actually located and unmasked?
This Note examines the prevalence of anonymous internet
speakers, the practical and legal issues that courts confront when
balancing the rights of anonymous internet speakers with those of
plaintiffs seeking to unmask them, and the serious dangers courts
expose speakers to if wrongfully unmasked. Part I argues that internet
speech merits the same First Amendment protections as traditional
speech, notes the unique benefits of anonymous internet speech,
examines the practical difficulties faced by courts and plaintiffs in
unmasking anonymous speakers, and details the immense dangers
these speakers face if wrongfully exposed. Part II analyzes the most
common approaches courts use when determining whether to unmask
an anonymous internet speaker, argues for the special treatment of
intellectual property claims within unmasking analyses, and grounds
the discussion by walking the reader through cases highlighting the
recent internet free-speech controversy in Texas. Finally, Part III
argues that, because the vast majority of courts treat internet and
traditional speech interchangeably and favor protecting anonymous
speech, anonymous internet speakers' identity should be protected
under a defendant-friendly standard with a rebuttable presumption in
favor of the plaintiff in IP infringement cases.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The First Amendment Offers Broad, but not Unlimited, Protection of
Speech
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First
Amendment offers broad, but not unconditional, protection to various
types of speech based on content. For example, obscene speech, true
threats, and fighting words are unprotected by the First Amendment,
and restrictions on such speech need only pass rational basis review. 12
11.
A discussion of why a First Amendment protects a right to anonymous free speech on
the internet can be found below. See infra Sections II.B-C.
12.
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (holding that the First Amendment
permits a state to ban true threats); Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989)

20191

PROTECTING SPEAKERS & PUNISHING PIRATES

185

In contrast, political and controversial speech receive the highest
possible First Amendment protection under strict scrutiny review.1 3
Separate still are other kinds of speech, like commercial speech,
receiving intermediate scrutiny review. 14 This Note addresses
anonymous internet speech, a categorization concerned with the
speech's form rather than its content. The Supreme Court firmly
rejected the idea that internet speech should be deprived of First
Amendment protections merely because it takes place online.15
B. The FirstAmendment Protects a Right to Anonymous Free Speech
The US Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the First
Amendment protects the right to speak anonymously. 16 For example, in
MclItyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Supreme Court confronted
a statute that prohibited the dissemination of campaign literature that
did not list the name or address of the person issuing it.17 Writing for
the majority, Justice Stevens concluded:
[U]nder our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent
practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield
from the tyranny of the majority. It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of
Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals
from

(noting that the Court has "repeatedly held that the protection of the First Amendment does not
extend to obscene speech"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (holding that fighting words
are not protected under the First Amendment).
13.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.))
("Laws that burden political speech are 'subject to strict scrutiny,' which requires the Government
to prove that the restriction 'furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest."'); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding that "[t]he First
Amendment does not permit [the imposition of] special prohibitions on those speakers who express
views on disfavored subjects," even expressive acts as extreme as cross burning, under strict
scrutiny).
14.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456-57 (1978)) ("The Constitution
therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally
guaranteed expression.").
15.
See discussion infra Section I.C.
16.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 199-200,
(1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60, 60-61, 65 (1960) (invalidating a statute that prohibited distribution of handbills without the
name and address of the preparer); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63
(1958) (compulsory disclosure of names of individuals engaging in activity protected under the
First Amendment right to freedom of association impermissibly created a "likelihood of a
substantial restraint" upon the exercise of protected activity that could result in a "repressive
effect").
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
17.

186
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their ideas from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant

The Court reached a similar conclusion in Buckley v. American
19 In Buckley, the Court confronted a
Constitutional Law Foundation.
state statute that forced petition circulators to wear identification
badges. 20 To qualify for these badges, prospective circulators had to
submit their names, addresses, and the amount of money they received
for circulating petitions. 2 1 The Court found that this requirement
impermissibly burdened the circulator's First Amendment rights
because it "compel[led] ...

identification at the precise moment when
the [speaker]'s interest in anonymity [was] greatest." 2 2

In the United States, anonymous speech has a long and
cherished history, playing an invaluable societal role from the nation's
founding through modernity. As Justice Black noted, "Anonymous
[speech has] played an important role in the progress of mankind.
Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have
been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously
or not at all." 23 Some of the most iconic US works were published
anonymously or pseudonymously in fear of retribution. As Justice Black
noted, "[T]he Federalist Papers, written in favor of the adoption of our
Constitution . . . [were] published under fictitious names." 2 4 Indeed,
Justice Stevens devoted an entire footnote in McIntyre to the value of
anonymous speech, noting that figures from Mark Twain and Ben
Franklin to Voltaire and Shakespeare all employed pseudonyms to
protect their identity. 2 5 He also noted that many anonymous speakers
have myriad legitimate reasons for choosing to conceal their identity,
stating that "[t]he decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by
fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social
ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as
possible." 26 Thus, the McIntyre Court held that the First Amendment
protects a speaker's "decision to remain anonymous." 27
18.
Id. (citations omitted).
19.
Buckley, 525 U.S. at 199-200.
20.
Id. at 188-89.
21.
Id.
22.
Id. at 199; see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton,
536 U.S. 150, 166-67 (2002) (holding that requiring a religious canvasser to register their name
in a publicly available document implicated the canvasser's anonymity interests and violated their
First Amendment rights).
Talley v. California, , 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
23.
24.
Id. at 65.
25.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341 n.4 (1995).
26.
Id. at 341-42.
27.
Id. at 342.
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C. Internet Speech Merits the Same Protectionsand Limitations as
TraditionalSpeech
Justice Stevens's statement that "the freedom to publish
anonymously extends beyond the literary realm" has far-reaching
implications. 28 In Reno v. ACLU, the Court addressed the applicability
of First Amendment protections to online communications. 29
Overturning an overly vague state statute regulating the content of
online discussion, the Court explicitly characterized internet speech in
the same terms as traditional speech: "Through the use of chat rooms,
any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of
Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can
become a pamphleteer." 30 After finding that the Court's "cases provide
no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that
should be applied to [the internet]," it invalidated the statute under
strict scrutiny. 3 1
In Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, the Court once
again applied a First Amendment strict scrutiny test when it upheld a
preliminary injunction concerning the Child Online Protection Act
(COPA). 32 Staying true to the principle put forth in Reno, the fact that
the speech took place on the internet had no bearing on the level of First
Amendment scrutiny the Court applied when it delivered its
judgment. 33
In 2017, the Court went further in exploring the connection
between internet and traditional speech in a case where North Carolina
passed a statute foreclosing social media access to sex offenders
altogether. 34 "While in the past there may have been difficulty in
identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the
exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace-the 'vast
democratic forums of the Internet' in general and social media in

28.
Id.
29.
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
30.
Id. at 870, 885; see also Best W. Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006
WL 2091695, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006) (citingReno, 521 U.S. at 870); Sony Music Entm't Inc.
v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Reno, 521 U.S. at 870; Doe v.
2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash. 2001); Columbia Ins. Co. v.
Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999)) ("Courts have recognized the Internet as a
valuable forum for robust exchange and debate.").
31.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 870, 874 (emphasis added).
32.
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004).
33.
Id. at 658; Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
34.
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
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particular." 35 The Court explained that internet speech merits
treatment equal to traditional speech given the internet's central place
in modern discourse. 36 Indeed, the Court held that "to foreclose access
to social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the
legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights." 37
If internet speech is equal to traditional speech, it should receive
the same level of protection. 38 The Court applied this principle in Reno
when it held that its "cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of
First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium [i.e.,
the internet]."39 According to the Court, the "content found on the
Internet is as diverse as [the range of] human thought" and as such
should not be unduly constrained. 40 This equal treatment comports with
the Court's decisions in Reno, Ashcroft, and Packingham.41 Moreover,
as the equal of traditional speech, it follows that "the protection of
Internet speech also includes the protection of anonymous electronic
speech." 42 Thus, courts should analyze both internet and traditional
speech under the same levels of scrutiny based on the speech's content
regardless of the medium through which the speaker communicates. 43
D. Anonymous Speech Is ParticularlyPrevalent and Valuable in the
Internet Context
The internet is particularly conducive to anonymous speech.
Indeed, many websites operate on the assumption that users have a
right to speak anonymously. For example, Reddit, Twitter, and
WordPress are often used by anonymous speakers to express
themselves.
Sexual and domestic abuse survivors, corporate
whistleblowers, and controversial political activists all use these and
other platforms to maintain their anonymity. These and other similarly
sensitive topics benefit from-or in many cases, require-the ability for
speakers to maintain their anonymity. On Reddit, in particular,
countless people communicate and seek support anonymously
Id. at 1735 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
35.
Id.
36.
Id. at 1737.
37.
38.
See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
39.
See id.
40.
Id. at 852 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521
U.S. 844 (1997)).
41.
See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735; Ashcroftv. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004); Reno,
521 U.S. at 870.
42.
In re Does 1-10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 820 (Tex. App. 2007) (citing Doe v. 2TheMart.com
Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash. 2001)).
43.
See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735; Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 673; Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.

20191

PROTECTING SPEAKERS & PUNISHING PIRATES

189

concerning sensitive topics that they feel unable to discuss under their
real names on "subreddits," such as r/relationships, r/divorce,
r/confessions, r/TwoXChromosomes, and r/anxiety, to name just a few.44
Many of these subreddits have hundreds of thousands, if not millions,
of anonymous posters and readers.4 5
Justice Stevens, however, noted that many persons speak
anonymously or pseudonymously because they fear unjust
repercussions for exercising their right to free speech.4 6 In particular,
the phenomenon of strategic lawsuits against public participation
(SLAPPs) loom large in the modern anonymous speaker's mind.4

7

SLAPPs are retaliatory suits brought by parties to intimidate and
silence those who have spoken out in the public sphere.4 8 The actual
resolution of the plaintiffs claims is largely secondary to their ultimate
goal of dissuading the defendant from engaging in damaging, offending,
or otherwise undesirable speech through drawn out, costly litigation.4 9
While anti-SLAPP statutes often help such defendants quickly shut
down these suits, many try to sidestep the problem altogether by
speaking anonymously.5 0 For example, Adrienne in hypothetical A
posted anonymously because she (correctly) feared that Andrew would
attempt to sue her for exercising her right to speak truthfully.
Anonymous internet speakers also provide unique value in the
form of anonymous ratings and reviews. For example, users on
Glassdoor can post in a "Company Reviews" section, rating and leaving
reviews of their experiences as employees for a given business, which
allows prospective employees to "[g]et the inside scoop and find out
what it's really like from people who've actually worked there." 51 This
feature provides insight into aspects of the employer's culture that may

44.
Subreddits are subcommunities on the website Reddit.com devoted to certain topics
denoted by their names. See infra note 45.
45.
See, e.g., r/Anxiety, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/anxiety [https://perma.cc/5A6Y3PZZ] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (286,000 readers); rIrelationships,REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/relationships/ [https://perma.cc/EAR8-22UD] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (2.6 million
readers);
r/TwoXChromosomes,
REDDIT,
https://www.reddit.com/r/TwoXChromosomes/
[https://perma.cc/3TVF-8ARH] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (12.5 million readers).
46.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995).
47.
Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Commentary, MEDIA L. RESOURCE CTR., https://www.medialaw.org/topics-page/anti-slapp?tmpl=component&print=1 [https://perma.cc/6MFD-RUX4] (last
visited Sept. 6, 2019).
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
Id.
50.
51.
See Company Reviews, GLASSDOOR, https://www.glassdoor.com/Reviews/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/C27U-KPEG] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
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not be readily apparent during the application process. 52 Similarly, Yelp
allows users to anonymously review their experiences with businesses
and service providers-ranging from dentists to restaurants to
mechanics-to help other Yelp users make choices on those vendors in
the future. 53 The ability to speak anonymously can be critical to users
sharing information freely.
Courts value anonymous internet speech. Confronted with a
case in which the plaintiffs sought to unmask anonymous individuals
for online defamatory comments, the US District Court for the Western
District of Washington noted:
The free exchange of ideas on the Internet is driven in large part by the ability of
Internet users to communicate anonymously. If Internet users could be stripped of

that anonymity by a civil subpoena enforced under the liberal rules of civil discovery,
this would have a significant chilling effect on Internet communications and thus on
54
basic First Amendment rights.

In Columbia Insurance Company v. Seescandy.com, the
Northern District of California held that the rights of injured parties
must be
balanced against the legitimate and valuable right to participate in online forums
anonymously or pseudonymously . .. Th[e] ability to speak one's mind without the
burden of the other party knowing all the facts about one's identity can foster open
communication and robust debate. Furthermore, it permits persons to obtain
information relevant to a sensitive or intimate condition without fear of
embarrassment. People who have committed no wrong should be able to participate
online without fear that someone who wishes to harass or embarrass them can file
a frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain the power of the court's order to discover their
identity.55

Several other courts that confronted plaintiffs trying to unmask
anonymous defendants made similar remarks concerning balancing a
plaintiffs right to redress their grievances with a defendant's right to
anonymous speech.56 Given the unique First Amendment value of
anonymous internet speech, it is unsurprising that courts show
reluctance in granting motions seeking to unmask anonymous
individuals online.

52.
Id.
53.
See YELP, https://www.yelp.com [https://perma.cc/8V79-THPK] (last visited Jan 18,
2020).
54.
Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (emphasis
added).
55.
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
56.
See, e.g., Sony Music Entm't Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) ("Courts have recognized the Internet as a valuable forum for robust exchange and debate.")
(citations omitted); In re Does 1-10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 820 (Tex. App. 2007) ("Several courts have
noted that Internet anonymity serves a particularly vital role in the exchange of ideas and robust
debate on matters of public concern.") (citations omitted).
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E. Anonymous Internet Speech Presents Unique Problems to Courts
The First Amendment does not unconditionally protect all forms
of speech and expression, regardless of whether the speech is
traditional or digital.5 7 Individuals can create and be liable for online
personas tied to their real-life identities. For example, the Court in
Elonis v. United States evaluated the conviction of a defendant under
18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which criminalizes the interstate transmission of
threats to another person.5 8 Elonis posted numerous Facebook status
updates containing self-styled rap lyrics concerning his estranged wife,
police officers, a kindergarten class, and an FBI agent.5 9 These lyrics
were staggeringly violent, describing the ways he would kill each of the
concerned parties in graphic detail.6 0 The Court assumed the statute
was a constitutional regulation of internet speech but reversed Elonis's
conviction on statutory grounds. 6 1
Anonymous internet speech, however, presents unique problems
to courts. Though "anonymous [speakers] ...

have a First Amendment

right to anonymous speech on the Internet, that right is subject to
limitation" in the same way as traditional speech. 62 As a Virginia
Circuit Court of Appeals noted, "Those who suffer damages as a result
of tortious or other actionable communications on the Internet should
be able to seek appropriate redress by preventing the wrongdoers from
hiding behind an illusory shield of purported First Amendment
rights." 63 Anonymous users can, and often do, attempt to escape liability

for defamation and infringement actions, among others, by hiding
behind a false persona and crying "free speech" when sued.6 4 This is
exactly what Betsy and the anonymous user in hypotheticals B and C
did when they defamed Bryan and infringed on Chris's design,
respectively.
It is difficult to understate the lengths that courts and counsel
undergo to unmask anonymous individuals that abuse their First
57.
See supra Sections II.B-C.
58.
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2007 (2015).
59.
See id.
See id. at 2005-07.
60.
61.
See id. at 2011.
62.
In re Does 1-10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 820 (Tex. App. 2007) (citing Polito v. AOL Time
Warner, Inc., 78 Pa. D. & C.4th 328 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2004)); see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656,
673 (2004) (applying strict scrutiny to a First Amendment challenge to a restriction on internet
speech); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (applying the same).
63.
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 35 (2000), reu'd sub
nom on other grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va.
2001).
64.
See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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Amendment rights. Anonymous users can sign up for a myriad of
websites, provide an email, chose a pseudonym, and become a posting
member in less than a minute.6 5 One need not provide a legitimate
email connected to their actual identity. Instead, internet users can
connect a fake email to a fake account on a website or social media. 66
One can even mask their IP address with the use of a virtual private
network (VPN) as they browse and post on the internet. One of the most
prominent VPNs is The Onion Router (TOR). By utilizing TOR, users
can bounce their IP address across several different servers, burying
the connection between their activities and the computer they used
beneath layers of encryption and misdirection. 6 7 Though TOR and its
advocates assert that its primary purpose is to ensure privacy (if not
the ability to circumvent highly repressive regimes 6 8 ),

there are

abuse. 69

abundant examples of its
This leaves plaintiffs like Bryan and
Chris in a difficult position; even if the court grants discovery, there is
no guarantee that it will successfully reveal the user's identity.
There are new tools, however, that may allow courts and counsel
to expose defendants hiding behind multiple masks. For example, one
professor claims that he has developed a way to piece TOR's layers back

For example, one can create a Twitter account by providing a username (by no means
65.
one's real name) and email. So long as the username has yet to be taken, the account opens
immediately. Sign Up, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/i/flow/signup [https://perma.cc/QT3J-XXT5]
(last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
66.
For example, one can create a Gmail account by providing a name and date of birth
(again, by no means one's real name or date of birth). So long as the name is unique, the account
opens immediately. Sign Up, GOOGLE, https://accounts.google.com/signup [https://perma.cc/ZC5MNZ6T] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
Tor:
Overview,
TOR,
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html
67.
See
[https://perma.cc/8PAR-66PE] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
For example, countries such as Burkina Faso and Uzbekistan show some of the
68.
highest TOR usage rates, allowing "people in those circumstances to do things that they otherwise
would not be able to do." See Joseph Cox, Countries That Use Tor Most Are EitherHighly Repressive
or Highly Liberal, MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 6, 2016, 9:40 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en-us/article/8q8xga/countries-that-use-tor-most-are-either-highly-repressive-or-highly-liberal
[https://perma.cc/7CGS-5MCH].
69.
One incredibly relevant example is the rise and fall of the first Silk Road website on
TOR, where individuals shrouded behind several layers of anonymity purchased illicit drugs, fake
IDs, and other commodities using cryptocurrency. See Marcell Nimfuehr, Silk Road: A Cautionary
Tale About Online Anonymity, MEDIUM (Aug. 18, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/thesilk-road-a-real-thriller-and-the-truth-about-the-anonymity-of-bitcoin- 198b519ca397
[https://perma.cc/7V68-Y9TX]. Indeed, a recently created graphic shows over six thousand
websites on TOR where individuals view, promote, and utilize "violence ... racism ... extreme
sexual content, credit card cloning products . . . a large number of Bitcoin scams," and numerous
other deeply concerning topics. Thomas Brewster, This Insane Map Shows All the Beauty and
Horror of the Dark Web, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2018, 5:20 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/20 18/03/13/dark-web-map-6000-webpages/# 1e95867b648b
[https://perma.cc/785FMNQY].
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together. 70 Boasting an 81 percent success rate in 2014, this tool could
be the first of many that plaintiffs can use to unmask defamers and
infringers hiding in the internet's dark corners.71 However, annoyed
parties like Andrew in hypothetical A can just as easily use this tool to
"SLAPP" the very users that need online anonymity the most. 72
But how do the benefits of unmasking these bad actors compare
with the costs inflicted on those who need the protections of anonymous
speech to participate in public discourse? Indeed, many internet users
will not voice their political opinions without the protection of
anonymity. Speakers fear that individuals with varying tolerance for
"offensive" or "intolerant" speech will attempt to identify, persecute,
and, in some cases, harm internet speakers who voice unpopular or
contrarian views by "doxing" them. 73 For example, doxing is often the
tactic most successfully (though by no means exclusively) utilized by
"far-left internet extremists" like Antifa to inflict "social and economic
punishment."7 4 Despite the fact that their speech is protected under the
First Amendment,7 5 victims of doxing have been harassed by
anonymous mobs, lost their jobs, and even been physically attacked for
their exercise of speech. 76
Illustrating its magnitude, a recent Department of Justice
bulletin addressed doxing as a form of particularly dangerous cyber
harassment, explaining that "[i]t can expose the victim to an
anonymous mob of countless harassers, calling their phones, sending
them email, and even appearing at the victim's home."7 7 The bulletin

gave the example of Zoe Quinn, a victim of doxing whose real name,
home address, email, passwords, and family details were exposed.7 8
Though Quinn was never physically confronted, she received thousands
of threats-including threats of rape and death-as a result of being

70.
Swati Khandelwal, 81% of Tor Users Can Be Easily Unmasked by Analysing Router
Information, HACKER NEWS (Nov. 18, 2014), https://thehackernews.com/2014/11/81-of-tor-userscan-be-easily-unmasked_18.html [https://perma.cc/86WD-E9S3].
Id.
71.
72.
See discussion supra Section I.D.
73.
Doxing is an attempt by one party to uncover information leading to an online
speaker's real-world identity for the sake of harassment. See Joey L. Blanch & Wesley L. Hsu, An
Introduction to Violent Crime on the Internet, U.S. ATTORNEYS' BULL., May 2016, at 2, 5.
74.
Emma Grey Ellis, Whatever Your Side, Doxing Is a Perilous Form of Justice,
WIRED
(Aug. 17, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/doxing-charlottesville/
[https://perma.cc/N9MH-VW9B].
75.
See supra Section I.A.
76.
See infra notes 78-80, 231-33, and accompanying text.
See Blanch & Hsu, supra note 73, at 5.
77.
78.
Id. at 5-6.
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doxed.7 9 Another example is that of Fox News anchor Tucker Carlson.
Tweets containing his personal information led to a group of Antifa
members appearing outside his home in what is now being investigated
as a politically motivated hate crime.8 0
It follows that there is a great need for courts to settle on a test
for unmasking individuals that vindicates an injured plaintiffs right to
expose wolves in free-speech clothing. At the same time, courts must
protect an individual's right to speak anonymously on the internet with
more than a paper tiger.8 1

F. Seescandy.com as the FirstProminent Unmasking Case
One of the first cases that created a test for unmasking
anonymous internet speakers was Seescandy.com in 1999. In that case,
Columbia Insurance Company, the holding company of See's Candy,
asked the Northern District of California to issue a temporary
restraining order (TRO) against the owners of seescandy.com. 82
However, the anonymous defendant hid his email, physical address,
phone number, and name of the domain owner behind layers of false
information. 83 Columbia's attempts to identify him were unsurprisingly
unsuccessful.8 4 As such, the court denied Columbia's motion as futile
because they could not gather the information required to serve the
defendant within a TRO's highly limited timeframe. 85 Further, they
could not obtain a preliminary injunction either, because courts cannot
grant such relief ex parte.8 6
Ultimately, the court noted a limited exception to the rule that
discovery can only commence after the defendant receives service,
seeking to avoid the defendant's attempt to hide its identity.8 7 The court

79.
Id.
80.
See Jessica Chasmar, Fox News Boycotts Twitter Over Handling of Tucker Carlson
Doxing:
Reports,
WASH.
TIMES
(Nov.
12,
2018),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/nov/12/fox-news-boycotts-twitter-over-handling-tucker-car/
[https://perma.cc/A36F-KKCJ]. For an example of a group doxed for exercising their right to
political speech, see discussion infra Part III.
81.
Merriam-Webster defines paper tiger as the following: "One that is outwardly
powerful or dangerous but inwardly weak or ineffectual." Paper Tiger, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/paper%/o20tiger [https://perma.cc/VL8N-6G2W] (last
visited Sept. 12, 2019).
82.
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 575 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
83.
Id. at 577.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
87.
Id.
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found that the exception applied in this case, given the way the internet
gave individuals
the

ability to commit certain tortious acts,

such

as defamation,

copyright

infringement, and trademark infringement, entirely on-line ... Parties who have
been injured by these acts are likely to find themselves chasing the tortfeasor from
Internet Service Provider (ISP) to ISP, with little or no hope of actually discovering
the identity of the tortfeasor.88

Thus, the court denied Columbia's motion without prejudice and
ordered it to refile within fourteen days, because it wanted Columbia to
establish several factors prior to the court's grant of preservice
discovery.8 9 The court ordered the plaintiff to (1) identify the missing
party with sufficient specificity so a court could determine that the
defendant is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal court,
(2) identify all previous steps taken to locate the defendant, (3)
establish that the plaintiffs suit could withstand a motion to dismiss,
and (4) file a statement of reasons justifying the specific discovery
requested as well as some identification of a limited number of persons
or entities on whom the discovery process might be served.9 0 The court
found that Columbia satisfied elements one through three and ordered
it to return in fourteen days with a discovery request, statement of
reasons, and identification of parties that would satisfy element four. 91
As detailed below, unmasking analyses would only expand from here.
II. ANALYSIS
Free-speech
protections-including
the right to
speak
anonymously-apply to expressive activity with as much force on the
internet as they do in the public square. 92 Furthermore, threats to a
speaker's ability to maintain anonymity threaten to chill activity that
falls within the core protections of the First Amendment. 93 As one Texas
Court of Appeals opined, while it is well settled that speakers have
free-speech rights to engage in anonymous speech, such a right would
be "of little practical value if there was no concomitant right to remain

88.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 575, 580-81.
89.
90.
Id. at 578-80.
91.
Id. at 578-81.
92.
See supra Sections II.B-C.
93.
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) (finding
that compulsory disclosure of the names of individuals engaging in activity protected under the
First Amendment impermissibly created a "likelihood of a substantial restraint" upon the exercise
of protected activity that could result in a "repressive effect").
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anonymous after the speech is concluded."9 4 In this context, "[T]he
chilling effect on the First Amendment right of free speech that results
from making such 'confidential' information [e.g., an anonymous
speaker's identity] too easily accessible is apparent."9 5
Courts are still obligated to balance the rights of injured
plaintiffs seeking to uncover anonymous wrongdoers with those of
defendants exercising their right to anonymous speech on the
internet. 96 As such, many courts require plaintiffs to make a threshold
showing before permitting discovery into an anonymous internet
speaker's identity.9 7 Lacking US Supreme Court guidance on the issue,

jurisdictions typically adopt one of two approaches: either the Dendrite
or Cahill test.98
A. The Dendrite Approach: An Overlarge Aegis
Though Seescandy.com came earlier, the New Jersey Superior
Court created the first test that maintained national traction in
Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe No. 3.99 In Dendrite, Dendrite
International brought a defamation claim against anonymous internet
speakers for messages posted on a forum. 100 The messages alleged that
Dendrite's president secretly, but unsuccessfully, attempted to sell the
company. 10 1 Dendrite sought discovery compelling the forum's ISP to
disclose the defendants' identities, but the court denied the company's
subpoena to disclose the identity of the anonymous speakers after
crafting a new test based on Seescandy.com. 102
The court relied on Talley and McIntyre to support a speaker's
right to anonymity and Reno to extend this right to internet speech. 103
In an attempt to balance Dendrite's right to recover for its alleged injury
with the defendants' rights to anonymous internet speech, the court

94.
In re Does 1-10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 820 (Tex. App. 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Doe
v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2001)).
95.
Id. at 821.
96.
Id. at 820 ("The courts must balance the right to communicate anonymously with the
right to hold accountable those who engage in communications that are not protected by the First
Amendment.").
97.
See, e.g., Best W. Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 WL 2091695, at
*4 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 463 (Del. 2005); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe
No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
98.
See infra Sections II.A-B.
99.
DendriteInt'l, Inc., 775 A.2d 756.
100.
Id. at 760.
101.
Id. at 763.
102.
Id. at 763-64, 766-68, 772; see also supra Section I.F.
103.
DendriteInt'l, Inc., 775 A.2d at 765.
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applied the following balancing test: to uncover an anonymous internet
speaker, plaintiffs must (1) undertake efforts to notify the anonymous
posters that they were the subject of a subpoena or application for an
order of disclosure and provide reasonable opportunity to oppose the
application, (2) identify and "set forth the exact statements purportedly
made by each anonymous poster that the plaintiff alleges constitutes
actionable speech," and (3) set forth a prima facie case against the
anonymous defendants by producing evidence for each element of the
cause of action. 104 Finally, the court must balance each prospective
defendant's First Amendment right of anonymous free speech against
the strength of the prima facie case presented and the necessity for the
disclosure of the defendant's identity. 105 The court ultimately affirmed
the trial court's denial of Dendrite's discovery request because Dendrite
failed to demonstrate that its injury was sufficiently connected to the
defendants' action, thus failing the balancing test. 106
Many courts follow the test put forth by Dendrite and relay their
interpretations of what should be considered within each factor. For
example, the Southern District of New York utilized the Dendrite test
in Sony Music Entertainment, Inc. v. Does 1-40.107 In Sony, Sony sued
to discover the identity of forty individuals that it alleged downloaded,
posted, and shared pirated music on the internet.1 08 Citing the Dendrite
test, the court divided out the test in a slightly different fashion,
requiring that plaintiffs show: (1) a prima facie case of copyright
infringement, (2) a sufficiently specific discovery request, (3) a
demonstration of an absence of an alternative means to obtain the
subpoenaed information, (4) a demonstration that the subpoenaed
information is central to the plaintiffs' claim, and (5) that plaintiffs'
alleged injuries outweigh the defendants' reasonable expectations of
privacy under the First Amendment. 109 The court granted discovery
because "defendants' First Amendment right to remain anonymous
[gave] way to plaintiffs' right to use the judicial process to pursue what
appear to be meritorious copyright infringement claims." 110 Ultimately,

104.
Id. at 760.
105.
Id. at 760-61.
106.
Id. at 772.
107.
Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 563-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
108.
Id. at 558.
109.
Id. at 565-66.
110.
Id. at 567. For other examples of courts that adopted and modified the Dendrite
standard, see In re Ind. Newspapers Inc., 963 N.E.2d 534, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (adopting a
modified Dendrite standard); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 457 (Md. 2009)
(adopting Dendrite); Mortg. Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Indus., Inc., 999 A.2d 184,
193 (N.H. 2010) (adopting Dendrite).
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this test favors anonymous defendants because the higher burden
placed on plaintiffs insulates trial court decisions from appellate
review.11 1
B. The Cahill Approach: A Plaintiff-FriendlyPaper Tiger
Not all courts choose to follow Dendrite. Nearly as popular is the
Cahill approach, developed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Doe v.
Cahill.112 In Cahill, an elected official sued to unmask four anonymous
defendants who posted comments concerning his "mental deterioration"
and "paranoia."113 While determining whether to grant Cahill's motion
for discovery, the court devoted several pages of its opinion to analyzing
the Dendrite test. 114
In the end, the court found that only prongs one and three of the
test merited adoption, requiring plaintiffs to go through reasonable
efforts to notify potential defendants of suit and provide a prima facie
case supporting the cause of action.1 15 It explicitly rejected the second
and fourth requirements as unhelpful, requiring plaintiffs to put forth
the exact speech they found objectionable and using a final balancing
test. 116 Specifically, it found that the second requirement "is subsumed"
by the third because, to present a prima facie case, the plaintiff would
"necessarily" need to quote the defendant's actionable language.11 7
Moreover, it found the final balancing test "unnecessary" because the
court believed that it "adds no protection above and beyond that of the
[prima facie requirement] and needlessly complicates the analysis."11 8

In analyzing the two remaining factors, the court implemented a
summary judgment standard.11 9 Ultimately, the court found Cahill's
claim lacked merit and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss
his claim. 12 0 This approach, designed to weed out only "silly or trivial
claims," is plaintiff-friendly because it imposes a lesser burden than the

111.
See, e.g., Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42, 50 (Pa. 2003) (deferring to the trial court's
discretion in denying discovery of the defendant's identity after adopting Dendrite). But see Doe I
v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254-57 (D. Conn. 2008) (employing Dendrite but ultimately
granting discovery into the defendant's identity)
112.
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
113.
Id. at 454.
114.
Id. at 459-60.
115.
Id. at 461.
116.
Id.
Id.
117.
118.
Id.
119.
Id. at 460.
120.
Id. at 468.

20191

PROTECTING SPEAKERS & PUNISHING PIRATES

199

Dendrite test by eliminating two of its four elements. 12 1 Thus, most
cases that use this standard ultimately expose the defendant's
identity.122
C. The Intellectual PropertyException: Sinking Masked Pirates in the
IP High Seas
Though one test is more cumbersome than the other, both still
burden plaintiffs that want to unmask anonymous internet speakers,
but that pressure can be case specific. Many jurisdictions hold that US
Supreme Court precedent and property rights concerns indicate that
plaintiffs seeking action against anonymous IP infringers should
benefit from a presumption in favor of unmasking the defendant in
these cases. 123 This is because, according to the Southern District of
New York, "the Supreme Court . . has made it unmistakably clear that
the First Amendment does not shield copyright infringement." 12 4 The
Fifth Circuit agreed in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Scoreboard
Posters, cautioning infringers that "[t]he first amendment is not a
license to trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual
property." 12 5
Confronting defendants that published software on their website
allowing users to decrypt and download major motion pictures, the
court in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes saw the case as
"another step in the evolution of the law of copyright occasioned by
advances in technology." 126 Even in 2000, the court noted that Congress
had repeatedly found that "[c]opyright and, more broadly, intellectual
property piracy are endemic [on the internet]." 127 The court continued,
explaining that "[t]o the extent there is any tension between free speech

121.
Id. at 459.
122.
See, e.g., Getaway.com LLC v. Does, No. CV 15-531-SLR, 2015 WL 4596413, at 2-3
(D. Del. July 30, 2015) (adopting Cahill, finding that the plaintiffs satisfied their burden, and
granting the plaintiffs discovery into the defendant's identity); Best W. Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No.
CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 WL 2091695, at *4, 6 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006) (adopting Cahill and
granting discovery into the defendant's identity); cf. Salehoo Group, Ltd. v. ABC Co., 722 F. Supp.
2d 1210, 1216, 1218 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (rejecting the Cahill formulation and quashing the
plaintiffs motion seeking to unmask the defendant).
123.
See Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990);
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
124.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d at 220 (citing Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-60 (1985)).
125.
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188
(5th Cir. 1979) (citing Zacchiniv. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 n.13 (1977)).
126.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d at 213.
127.
Id. at 225 (footnote omitted).
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and protection of copyright, the [Supreme] Court has found it to be
accommodated fully by traditional fair use doctrine." 12 8
Ten years earlier, the Eleventh Circuit confronted a nearly
identical issue in Cable/Home Communication Corp. Network
Productions, Inc. 12 9 In Cable Communication, the defendant created
software that allowed users to pirate HBO programming by decrypting
the satellite signal used to broadcast it.130 Agreeing with the Fifth
Circuit that "[t]he first amendment is not a license to trammel on
legally recognized rights in intellectual property," 13 1 the Eleventh
Circuit found that the carrying out and facilitation of piracy was far
outside the First Amendment's protections. 132
The practical realities surrounding internet IP infringement
make utilizing this exception crucial. As the World Intellectual
Property Organization noted, "[T]he fastest growing area of counterfeit
trade is online." 133 Over $133 billion alone was spent online on
counterfeit products in 2009, a number that has grown over the past
decade. 134 Arguably, the most valuable asset that a company has is its
"brand," particularly in the contexts of launching initial public offerings
and completing mergers and acquisitions. 1 35 Indeed, "[t]ime is of the
essence as each minute that an infringing site operates exponentially
increases the risks that the targeted brand will suffer irreversible
damage." 136 Plaintiffs who cannot unmask infringing defendants in a
timely manner may find it to be too little, too late for their bottom line
when a court finally grants discovery into an infringer's identity. Courts
can prevent such losses by adopting the IP exception into an unmasking
framework.
The damage that anonymous internet infringement inflicts on
the economy supports adopting the exception as well. The US
Department of Commerce estimates that the domestic value of stolen
intellectual property is between $200 billion and $250 billion

128.
Id. at 220 (footnote omitted).
129.
Cable/Home Commc'n Corp., 902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990).
130.
Id. at 834.
131.
Id. at 849 (quoting Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600
F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979)).
132.
Id. at 850.
133.
Jochen M. Schaefer, IP Infringement Online: The Dark Side of Digital,
WIPO: MAG. (April 2011), https://www.wipo.int/wipo-magazine/en/2011/02/article_0007.html
[https://perma.cc/979D-NXG5].
Id.
134.
135.
Id.
136.
Id.
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annually.137 Some industries, such as entertainment and software, are
hit hard by such theft. 138 The Department of Commerce found that
these industries and others like them have suffered losses in excess of
$58 billion annually due to online copyright piracy alone. 139 Indeed, the
Department of Commerce found that 27.7 percent of Americans work in
fields that rely intensely upon IP protection to remain profitable. 140
"Without IP rights protection, others can profit from the sunk costs of
others, putting the innovator at a disadvantage" and subjecting both
the innovator and the market to substantial economic loss. 1 4 1 The fact
that many pirates know better than to fly their flag and employ
technology that makes it very difficult to locate them in the real world
only complicates the matter. 142
Piracy in the high seas of the international market has similarly
disturbing implications on national economic security. 14 3 The US
International Trade Commission estimates that Chinese theft of US
intellectual property alone amounts to a loss of nearly $48 billion,
leading to a loss of almost one million US jobs.144 Total job losses from
IP theft range from 3.8 to 4.8 million jobs.14 5 Implementing the
presumption in favor of unmasking defendants when plaintiffs assert
infringement claims is based in both strong legal precedent and a
compelling need to protect and enrich the US economy.
The internet makes it incredibly easy for wily defendants to
anonymously infringe on intellectual property, draining millions of jobs
and billions of dollars from the economy. 14 6 As discussed in Section I.E,
it is difficult for plaintiffs to attempt to locate anonymous internet
infringers when courts grant discovery into their identity.14 7 By
implementing the IP exception in unmasking analyses, the legal system
can help innovators protect their creations and keep US jobs and dollars
in the hands of US citizens.

137.
Reggie Ash, Protecting Intellectual Property and the Nation's Economic
Security, LANDSLIDE, May-June 2014, at 20, 21.
138.
Id. at 22.
139.
Id.
140.
Id. at 21.
141.
Id. at 21-22.
142.
See discussion of the practical difficulties surrounding unmasking anonymous users
supra Section I.E.
143.
Ash, supra note 137, at 22.
144.
Id.
145.
Id. at 23.
146.
See id at 20-22.
147.
See supra Section I.E.
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D. High Noon: The Unmasking Showdown in Texas
The problems surrounding the use (and abuse) of discovery to
unmask anonymous internet speakers came to a head in Texas because
of an interaction between Texas's anti-SLAPP statute, the Texas
Citizens Participation Act (TCPA),14 8 and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
202 ("Rule 202").149 Plaintiffs appear to be using Rule 202 as a loophole
to circumvent the TCPA and "SLAPP" anonymous internet speakers
with meritless suits.

15 0

These cases illustrate the real-world effects that

unmasking efforts can have on anonymous speakers-namely, forcing
them to endure behavior that anti-SLAPP statutes were designed to
curtail.1 5 1

The TCPA provides that "[i]f a legal action is based on, relates
to, or is in response to a party's exercise of the right of free
speech . . . that party may file a motion to dismiss the legal action." 152
The statute defines a legal action as "a lawsuit, cause of action, petition,
complaint, cross-claim or counter-claim or any other judicial pleading
or filing that requests legal or equitable relief." 153 When a party files a
TCPA motion to dismiss, all discovery into the legal action must cease
until the court rules on the motion to dismiss. 15 4 Rule 202 allows

plaintiffs to file a "petition" in court for limited pre-suit discovery "to
investigate a potential claim or suit." 15 5 Since serving an anonymous

internet speaker directly is often impossible, many plaintiffs serve the
petition on service providers and website owners in an attempt to reveal
the speaker's identity without having to file an actual "suit" that
triggers the TCPA. 15 6 As discussed below, while some Texas courts
recognize that the TCPA clearly applies to Rule 202 vis-a-vis the
statute's use of the word "petition," others unfortunately fail to see this
clear textual application.

148.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001-011 (West 2018).
149.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1.
150.
See, e.g., DeAngelis v. Protective Parents Coal., 556 S.W.3d 836 (Tex. App. 2018);
Glassdoor, Inc. v. Andra Grp., LP, 560 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. App. 2017), vacated, 575 S.W.3d 523 (Tex.
2019); In re Elliott, 504 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. App. 2016).
151.
See discussion supra Section I.D.
152.
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. § 27.003(a).
153.
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(6) (emphasis added).
154.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.003(c).
155.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1 (emphasis added).
156.
See DeAngelis, 556 S.W.3d 836; Glassdoor, Inc., 560 S.W.3d 281; In re Elliott, 504
S.W.3d 455.
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1. In re Elliot
In 2016, the Texas Third Court of Appeals in Austin examined
the interaction between the TCPA and Rule 202 in In re Elliot.

15 7

In In

re Elliot, a user writing under the pseudonym of "The Pump Stopper"
published an article negatively reflecting on the financial prospects of
MagneGas, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Florida. 15 8
MagneGas filed a Rule 202 petition in response, alleging that Elliot was
affiliated with the article because he owned a website by the name of
"PumpStopper" and believed he could help find the article's author.15 9
Instead of scheduling a hearing to serve Elliot with the petition,
MagneGas served Elliot with a subpoena for a deposition based solely
on its Rule 202 petition without obtaining an order authorizing it to do
so.16o After refusing to attend this deposition through counsel, Elliot
filed several motions aimed at curtailing MagneGas's efforts to compel
his compliance in revealing the anonymous speaker's identity. 16 1 Soon
after, the user appeared as a John Doe and filed a TCPA motion to
dismiss MagneGas's Rule 202 petition, asserting that its petition
sought to curtail Doe's freedom of speech. 162 The trial court ultimately
granted MagneGas's petition and ordered discovery into material
"relating to the ... article by PumpStopper" without ruling on Doe's
TCPA motion to dismiss.

1 63

Elliot responded

by petitioning for

mandamus relief to prevent pre-suit discovery, asking the court of
appeals to compel the trial court to address Doe's TPCA motion. 164
The court of appeals first noted that the issue was appropriate
for mandamus consideration because Rule 202 petitions were ancillary
to the possible subsequent suit and thus were neither final nor
appealable. 165 In an attempt to stave off relief, MagneGas argued that
the TCPA has no application to a Rule 202 proceeding. 166 Specifically,
it argued that the TCPA's purpose is to "dispose of lawsuits," that a Rule
202 petition as a pre-suit discovery mechanism is not a lawsuit, and
157.
In re Elliot, 504 S.W.3d 455.
158.
Id. at 458.
159.
Id.
160.
Id.
161.
Id.
162.
Id. at 458-59.
163.
Id.
164.
Id.
165.
Id. at 459. This issue is particularly concerning in the SLAPP context, as the harm
from SLAPPs comes not from a possible settlement or judgment but from the fact that the plaintiff
forced the defendant to hire counsel and go through the expensive litigation process to begin with.
See discussion supra Section I.D.
166.
In re Elliot, 504 S.W.3d. at 463.

204

VAND. J ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 22:1:181

that the word "petition" in the TCPA refers to a pleading that asserts a
cause of action or a claim.16 7

The court noted that the entire purpose of the TCPA is "to
encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons
to . . speak freely . . to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at
the same time, protect the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits
for demonstrable injury." 168 "The [TCPA] accomplishes its purpose by
providing a mechanism for early dismissal of 'legal actions' that are
based on a party's exercise of the right of free speech." 169 As a "filing
that requests equitable relief' in the form of pre-suit discovery, the
court found that Rule 202 petitions certainly fall within the ambit of
legal actions that could potentially impact a person's freedom of
speech. 170 Finding that the TCPA applied to Rule 202 petitions, the
court ultimately held that the trial court abused its discretion by
permitting prediscovery under Rule 202 without first ruling on Doe's
TCPA motion to dismiss.17 1

2. Glassdoor
The Texas Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dallas confronted
the same legal question and similar facts in Glassdoor Inc. v. Andra
Group.172 In Glassdoor, ten anonymous users claiming to be current or
former employees of Andra posted negative reviews on Glassdoor's
website. 173 Unable to access these anonymous internet speakers
directly, Andra filed a Rule 202 petition seeking to depose a Glassdoor
representative in an attempt to unmask the users for suit.17 4 Glassdoor
and Does One and Two responded with TCPA motions to dismiss. 17 5 The

trial judge, after reviewing affidavits and other evidence submitted by
the parties, denied the TCPA motions to dismiss and partially granted
the Rule 202 petition insofar as it related to two sets of reviews. 176 The
reviews identified in the order were not those allegedly written by the
Doe parties and, as such, Glassdoor and the Doe parties appealed.177
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
S.W.3d 523
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
In re Elliot, 504 S.W.3d. at 460-61.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 464-65.
Id. at 465.
Glassdoor, Inc. v. Andra Grp., LP, 560 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. App. 2017), vacated, 575
(Tex. 2019).
Id. at 285.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court dismissed the Doe parties' claims as lacking in
standing because the trial court did not permit discovery into their
identities in particular. 178 The court addressed whether the trial court
abused its discretion by granting Andra's Rule 202 petition and
granting discovery despite the users' First Amendment right to speak
anonymously.17 9 Assuming without deciding that it would be
appropriate to adopt the Cahill approach in unmasking cases, 18 0 the
court found that there was sufficient evidentiary support to allow Andra
discovery under Rule 202.181 Notably, the court refused to determine
whether the TCPA applies to Rule 202, despite Andra, like MagneGas
above, arguing that it does not. 182
By affirming the trial court, the appellate court allowed Andra
significant discovery into the anonymous internet speakers connected
with the two sets of reviews without filing a formal suit, because Rule
202 is a pre-suit mechanism. 183 By allowing Andra to utilize a Rule 202
petition in this way, the court effectively sanctioned the use of a Rule
202 petition as a back door to the TCPA. 184 Though the Supreme Court
of Texas granted certiorari for this case, it entirely sidestepped the
unmasking dilemma by vacating and dismissing the case on mootness
grounds.18 5

3. DeAngelis
One year later, the Texas Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth
confronted similar issues in DeAngelis v. ProtectiveParents Coalition.186
In DeAngelis, the Protective Parents Coalition (PPC) maintained a
website and Facebook page where they posted what they purported to
have observed in family court proceedings. 187 The PPC asserted "that in
the process of litigating family law cases, judges, attorneys, and court
staff abuse their power to the detriment of children" for their personal
gain.18 8 Many users posted vitriolic comments on both the PPC website
178.
Id. at 285-86.
179.
Id. at 292.
180.
Id. (citing In re Does 1-10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 820 (Tex. App. 2007)) (analyzing and
utilizing the Cahill unmasking approach).
Id. at 294.
181.
182.
Id.; see also Brief on the Merits of Respondent Andra Group, LP at 16, Glassdoor, Inc.
v. Andra Grp., LP, 575 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. 2019) (No. 17-0463).
183.
Glassdoor,Inc., 560 S.W.3d at 294-95.
184.
See id.
185.
Glassdoor, Inc. v. Andra Grp., LP, 575 S.W.3d 523, 531 (Tex. 2019).
186.
DeAngelis v. Protective Parents Coal., 556 S.W.3d 836, 842 (Tex. App. 2018).
187.
Id. at 841.
188.
Id.
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and Facebook group.18 9 A group of attorneys often mentioned on the
website filed a Rule 202 petition seeking pre-suit discovery into the
PPC, claiming a need to investigate a potential claim for defamation. 19 0
The PPC responded with a TCPA motion to dismiss, alleging that the
attorneys were attempting to chill their exercise of freedom of speech
by attempting to "discover" information already at their fingertips. 191
The trial court granted the PPC's motion to dismiss, which the
attorneys promptly appealed.192
After holding that a plain textual reading of the TCPA and Rule
202 supports Rule 202 falling under the TCPA, the court analyzed
whether the PPC's TCPA motion to dismiss was appropriate. 193 Since
the PPC's website, Facebook page, and individual PPC members' social
media accounts were general publications intended for general public
consumption and the speech was of "significant public concern," the
TCPA motion to dismiss was appropriate.19 4 Thus, the court held that
the PPC's TCPA motion to dismiss applied to the attorneys' Rule 202
petition.19 5
The court then examined whether the trial court correctly
granted the TCPA motion to dismiss. 196 Specifically, it inquired whether

the attorneys produced clear and sufficient evidence demonstrating
that "the likely benefit of allowing the petitioner ... to investigate a
potential claim outweighs the burden or expense of the procedure"
imposed on the respondent. 197 The court responded in the negative.19 8
It first noted that Rule 202 relief was never intended for routine use
and "may not be used to circumvent discovery limitations that would
govern the anticipated suit."19 9 Indeed, it found that "the document
requests [contained within the petition] appear[ed] so draconian that
they would not be allowed in an actual lawsuit." 2 00 It then found that

the petition not only failed to explain why pre-suit discovery was
necessary but the petition demonstrated that pre-suit discovery was
unnecessary because the Attorneys already [had] more than enough

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

845-46.
842.
845.
846-47.
849.
850-51.
852.
853.
854.
855 (citing In re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d 932, 933 (Tex. 2011)).
858.

20191

PROTECTING SPEAKERS & PUNISHING PIRATES

207

information to file an action for defamation without resorting to Rule
202."201

The court also went through pains to address a topic not fully
briefed by the parties: the petitioners' desire to use a Rule 202 petition
to unmask anonymous speakers. 202 The court emphasized that the fact
that the speakers may have been masked 203 was irrelevant to the fact
that their speech merited First Amendment protection. 204 The court
admonished potential Rule 202 petitioners that attempting to unmask
anonymous internet speakers "through the mechanism of pre-suit
discovery seems to tread on very dangerous ground, arguably
circumventing the very purposes of anti-SLAPP legislation and
long-established First Amendment protections." 205 "Just as Rule 202
cannot be used as a tool to circumvent the free speech protections of the
TCPA," the court continued, "impermissible pre-suit document
discovery should not be used as a tool to stifle or quash speech on
matters of public concern, however much we disagree or dislike such
speech, without the filing of a formal lawsuit." 2 06 Ultimately, the court

affirmed the trial court's dismissal under the TCPA because the
attorneys failed to demonstrate that their potential benefit outweighed
the enormous costs pre-suit discovery would place on the PPC.207
4. Tying the Cases Together
In re Elliot, Glassdoor, and DeAngelis each demonstrated facets
of the issues surrounding unmasking anonymous internet speakers. In
re Elliot and Glassdoor squarely addressed the efforts that business
plaintiffs go through to unmask anonymous defendants that allegedly
defamed them. 208 These plaintiffs, like those in hypotheticals A and B,
have an interest in unmasking the defendants whose statements may
very well harm their bottom line and personal reputation. The
defendants, like those in hypotheticals A and B, have an equal interest
in maintaining their anonymity in asserting their First Amendment
rights.

201.
Id. at 857.
202.
Id. at 857 n.10.
203.
The court notes that, as to the speakers on the PPC's Facebook page, it was doubtful
they were masked because "on Facebook one often associates their real name and a photograph of
their face with their profile." Id.
204.
DeAngelis, 556 S.W.3d at 857 n.10.
205.
Id.
206.
Id. at 858.
207.
Id.
208.
See supra Sections II.D. 1-2.
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DeAngelis addressed a different set of issues: the practical
problems posed by a system that potentially allows plaintiffs easy
access to an anonymous speaker's identity. 2 09 Inadequately protecting
an anonymous internet speaker's identity, especially through pre-suit
discovery mechanisms, subjects speakers to the very harm that
anti-SLAPP statutes are supposed to prevent. 2 10 Moreover, it deprives
them of the ability to make the kinds of important contributions to
public fora that anonymous speech elicits. 211 The problem, of course, is
in determining how to "balance the right to communicate anonymously"
on the internet with "the right to hold accountable those who engage in
communications that are not protected by the First Amendment." 212
III. SOLUTION
Currently, many courts that have confronted plaintiffs seeking
to unmask anonymous internet speakers have settled on either
adopting or adapting one of two analyses: the Dendrite or Cahill
approach. 2 13 Both of these approaches fail to appropriately balance the
right to anonymous internet speech with the need to vindicate an
injured plaintiffs rights by tilting the scale too far in one direction or
the other. 214 Moreover, neither of these approaches consider the strong
legal basis for and overwhelming practical importance of lowering the
plaintiffs burden to unmask anonymous infringers. The test that best
balances plaintiff and anonymous internet speaker interests is a
Dendrite approach that implements a rebuttable presumption in favor
of the plaintiff in IP infringement cases.
The current Dendrite test places a high burden on plaintiffs by
imposing a three-part requirement that they (1) attempt to notify the
anonymous speaker, (2) offer the exact statements that the anonymous
speaker purportedly made that allegedly constitutes actionable speech,
and (3) set forth a prima facie case against the anonymous defendants
by producing evidence for each element of the cause of action. 2 15 This
concludes with a balancing test whereby the court weighs the speaker's
right of anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie
case presented and the necessity for the disclosure of the speaker's

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See discussion supra Section II.D.3.
See discussion supra Section II.D.3.
See discussion supra Section II.D.3; see also supra Section I.D.
In re Does 1-10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 820 (Tex. App. 2007).
See supra Sections II.A-B.
See discussion supra Sections II.A-B.
Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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identity. 2 16 Though the degree to which this test protects anonymous
speakers is admirable, its current application is overbroad. Namely, it
confers the same First Amendment protections to anonymous internet
infringers as it does to anonymous internet speakers during its
balancing analysis, a quality clearly at odds with Supreme Court
precedent. 2 17
Cahill, however, simultaneously over- and underprotects
anonymous internet speakers. By eliminating the first and third
portions of the Dendrite approach, Cahill was explicitly designed to
weed out only "silly or trivial claims." 2 18 Instead, a "plaintiff must make
reasonable efforts to notify the defendant and must satisfy the
summary judgment standard." 219 At first, this appears to overprotect
defendants because a summary judgment standard demands litigants
present factual disputes sufficient to withstand dismissal. 220 Without so
much as the defendant's identity, it seems difficult to imagine any
plaintiff making a sufficient showing. 221 In reality, however, the Cahill
approach is a paper tiger, a pared-down version of Dendrite that
expressly eschews the necessity of weighing the plaintiffs interests in
discovery with the speaker's right to anonymous internet speech. 222 As
noted above, courts that utilize the Cahill approach are far more likely
to grant discovery into the speaker's identity than those that implement

Dendrite.223
Just because speech takes place on the internet does not deprive
it of any of the protections that it would be afforded otherwise. 224
Indeed, the importance of protecting anonymous speech on the internet
weighs in favor of adopting the Dendrite approach. Through
pseudonyms or purely anonymous posts and messages, speakers can
engage in incredibly valuable and meaningful forms of speech. 225
Speakers can openly participate in communities where they can seek
support and give advice on sensitive social topics like divorce and
216.
Id. at 760-61.
217.
"[T]he Supreme Court ... has made it unmistakably clear that the First Amendment
does not shield copyright infringement." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d
211, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
555-60 (1985)); see also supra Section II.C.
218.
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 459 (Del. 2005).
219.
Id. at 461.
220.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
221.
Judge Tuaro observed as much while analyzing and ultimately rejecting the Cahill
approach. See McMann v. Doe, 460 F. Supp. 2d 259, 267 (D. Mass. 2006).
222.
See id. at 268.
223.
See discussion supra Section II.B.
224.
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997); see also supra Sections II.B-C.
225.
See discussion supra Section I.D.
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mental illness. They can be whistleblowers, exposing corporate and
political wrongdoing. They can honestly review their experiences at
stores and in businesses as both customers and employees. 226 Perhaps
most importantly, they can give voice to political opinions that they
would be afraid to put forth otherwise. 2 2 7

The threats anonymous speakers face if unjustly unmasked are
real. The most chilling example is doxing. Harrowing enough to merit
being specifically addressed in a Department of Justice bulletin, victims
of doxing are exposed to an "anonymous mob of countless harassers,
calling their phones, sending them emails, and even appearing at the
victim's home." 22 8 This threat has a particularly chilling effect on
political speech, the most highly protected form of speech under the
First Amendment, 229 because doxing efforts primarily target those
expressing contrarian views. 230
For example, members of the Young Conservatives of Texas at
the University of Texas at Austin were doxed by an Antifa group simply
for their membership status and "liking" of conservative pages on social
media. 231 In response to the students' First Amendment exercise, the
Antifa group posted the members' names, emails, photographs, and
employer phone numbers online. 2 32 These posts vilified the students for

their political beliefs and encouraged viewers to call the students'
employers and attempt to get them fired. 2 33

The Online Safety Modernization Act of 2017 (the "Act"), if it
passes, will address doxing by criminalizing the knowing publication of
a person's personally identifiable information with "the intent that the
information will be used to threaten, intimidate, or harass any person,
incite or facilitate the commission of a crime of violence against any
person, or place any person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily
injury." 2 34 Indeed, Title III of the Act is called the "Interstate Doxxing
Provision." 2 35 The fact that this bill exists suggests congressional

226.
See discussion supra Section I.D.
227.
See discussion supra Section I.D.
228.
See Blanch & Hsu, supra note 73, at 5.
229.
See Citizens Unitedv. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 339-40 (2010).
See Ellis, supra note 74.
230.
231.
Toni Airaksinen, More Than 30 UT Students Doxxed for Crime of Being Conservative,
PJ MEDIA (Jan. 13, 2019), https://pjmedia.com/trending/more-than-30-ut-students-doxxed-forcrime-of-being-conservative/ [https://perma.cc/4GFL-2R8L].
232.
Id.
233.
Id.
234.
Online Safety Modernization Act of 2017, H.R. 3067, 115th Cong. § 301 (2017).
235.
Id.
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acknowledgment that a doxing problem exists-one so severe as to
merit criminal sanctions. 236
Adopting the Dendrite approach better protects anonymous
internet speakers from another threat: SLAPP suits. 2 37 Having too low
of a burden in unmasking analyses allows plaintiffs to abuse a court's
ability to grant discovery into an anonymous internet speaker's
identity, allowing them to further draw out meritless litigation. Such a
result sanctions a plaintiffs wrongful desire to chill protected speech. 238
Moreover, such a result is directly contrary to the majority of
states' judgment on the value of First Amendment protections. Many
states have acknowledged just how valuable speech-anonymous and
otherwise-is on the internet. 239 Currently, thirty-one states have
anti-SLAPP statutes, and the common law in two others simulates
these statutes. 240 These statutes, like the TCPA, typically allow
defendants an expedited process through which they can petition the
court to shut down suits that implicate their First Amendment rights. 241
Courts should adopt the Dendrite approach because it vindicates the
majority position that SLAPP suits must be halted at the earliest stage
possible by appropriately burdening SLAPP plaintiffs attempting to
unmask anonymous internet speakers.
The Dendrite approach, though superior to the Cahill approach
because it more appropriately protects an anonymous internet
speaker's First Amendment rights, still falls short because it fails to
acknowledge the difference between anonymous speech and anonymous
IP infringement. Plaintiffs alleging the latter deserve a rebuttable
presumption in their favor during the court's balancing analysis out of
concern for property rightS 2 4 2 and Supreme Court precedent that makes
it "unmistakably clear" that the First Amendment "does not shield
copyright infringement." 2 4 3
Additionally,
the
practical
considerations
underlying
anonymous IP infringement on the internet cannot be understated.
236.
See id.
237.
See discussion supra Section I.D.
238.
See discussion supra Section I.D.
239.
See State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://antislapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection/#reference-chart [https://perma.cc/2AK5-RVLR] (last
visited Sept. 12, 2019).
240.
Id.
241.
See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003(a) (West 2018) ("If a legal action
is based on, relates to, or is in response to a party's exercise of the right of free speech . . . that
party may file a motion to dismiss the legal action."); see also supra Section II.D.
242.
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188
(5th Cir. 1979).
243.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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First, "each minute that an infringing site operates [or that an
infringing post remains accessible] exponentially increases the risks
that the [plaintiff] will suffer irreversible damage." 2 44 Plaintiffs who
cannot unmask infringing defendants in a timely manner may find it to
be too little, too late when a court finally grants discovery into an
infringer's identity. Implementing the IP exception's rebuttable
presumption will speed the court's balancing analysis. This need for
speed is doubly important considering how difficult it is for courts and
counsel to uncover wily pirates hiding behind layers of encryption and
misdirection. 2 4 5 As noted above, even unsophisticated infringers can
make use of false emails, account names, and VPNs to hide their illicit
activity in only a few minutes. 246 This change of pace may make all the
difference for an injured plaintiffs need to staunch the flow of capital
bleeding out because of a defendant's anonymous infringement.
Moreover, the costs associated with IP infringement are
staggering-between $200 and $250 billion are lost each year to IP
theft, a significant portion of which likely occurs anonymously on the
internet. 24 7 Indeed, over a quarter of US citizens work in fields intensely
dependent upon IP protection to remain profitable. 248 The threat posed
by IP theft over the internet has international implications as well.
Chinese theft of US intellectual property alone amounts to a loss of
nearly $48 billion, leading to a loss of almost one million US jobs. 249 Ash
estimates that the total losses from IP theft fall between 3.8 million and
4.8 million jobs. 2 50 By implementing the IP exception into the Dendrite
analysis, courts can take a step toward helping innovators keep the
profits of their hard work and rescuing the millions of jobs lost to IP
infringement.
Thus, the altered Dendrite analysis proceeds as follows: to
succeed in an unmasking claim, plaintiffs must (1) undergo reasonable
efforts to notify the anonymous speaker of the impending unmasking
attempt and possible suit, (2) offer the exact statements that the
anonymous speaker purportedly made that allegedly constitute
actionable speech, and (3) set forth a prima facie case against the
anonymous speakers by producing evidence for each element of the
cause of action. 251 The court will then weigh the speaker's right of
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See Schaefer, supra note 133.
See discussion supra Section I.E.
See discussion supra Section I.E.
See Ash, supra note 137, at 21.
See id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie case
presented and the necessity for the disclosure of the speaker's identity
in pursuing the action. 2 52 If the plaintiff makes a prima facie case for IP
infringement, the court should apply a strong rebuttable presumption
in favor of unmasking the anonymous defendant when it conducts the
balancing test.
IV. CONCLUSION

The problems posed by plaintiffs seeking to wrongfully unmask
anonymous internet speakers are legion. These plaintiffs, like Andrew
in hypothetical A, may want to use unmasking suits to "SLAPP" down
meritorious criticism. Perhaps a plaintiff is offended by the anonymous
speaker's political statements and wants to misappropriate the court's
power to expose their identity in what may ultimately function as a
form of legally sanctioned doxing. 2 53 At the same time, plaintiffs like

Bryan in hypothetical B must be able to vindicate their interests when
confronted with defamatory statements. The most popular approaches
to unmasking, the Dendrite and Cahill analyses, fail to appropriately
balance the right to anonymous internet speech with the need to
vindicate an injured plaintiffs rights by simultaneously over- and
underprotecting anonymous defendants. Moreover, neither of these
approaches consider the strong legal basis for and overwhelming
practical importance of lowering the plaintiffs burden to unmask
anonymous infringers. This failure exposes plaintiffs like Chris in
hypothetical C to a level of actual and potential economic injury that
flies in the face of current case law and critical economic considerations.
Adopting a modified Dendrite analysis remedies these issues by
providing a heavy rebuttable presumption in favor of unmasking
anonymous IP infringers. This approach appropriately balances the
strong First Amendment precedent that protects anonymous internet
speech with the need to staunch the flow of capital bleeding from the
US economy through IP theft. It also explicitly enforces the important
legal distinction between anonymous internet speakers and anonymous
internet infringers, which current analyses fail to do. In sum, courts
should adopt the modified Dendrite analysis because it protects

252.
253.

Id. at 760-61.
See discussion of doxing supra Section I.E, Part III.
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anonymous speakers while exposing wolves in free-speech clothing.
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